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DEBATE TRANSCRIPT
RICO AND ITS PROGENY: GOOD OR BAD LAW?
THE FOLLOWING IS A TRANSCRIPT OF A DEBATE WHICH
TOOK PLACE AT THE THOMAS J. WHITE CENTER ON LAW
& GOVERNMENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME
ON NOVEMBER 14, 1985. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE DE-
BATE WERE THE HONORABLE ABNER J. MIKVA, U.S.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIR'
CUIT AND G. ROBERT BLAKEY, O'NEILL PROFESSOR OF
LAW, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME.
ABNER J. MIKVA
I am pleased to be back on the campus of Notre Dame.
It has been a long time. I am especially pleased to share a
platform With my old friend and former colleague, Professor
Blakey. He certainly is one of the fathers, if not the father of
RICO.1 He was present at the creation. He has readily admit-
ted his responsibility and has watched with pride as kid RICO
has grown up to be one of the law's most notorious bullies.
I would like to explain RICO to you, as I see it, before I
tell you why I think Blakey's offspring ought to be put in the
closet for good. When I was practicing labor law, we used to
tell a story about a strike that had gone on for many, many
months, and finally, the union and the management agreed
on a settlement; but under the terms of the union's constitu-
tion, every member of the bargaining committee had to phys-
ically sign the agreement. They went through the signing
ceremony-all the management people signed it; all the
union people signed it, until they got to old Gus, who refused
to sign it. They begged him, they pled with him, they ex-
plained the strike would go on, and still he would not sign it.
They got the president of the international union in Wash-
ington on the phone and he talked to old Gus, and Gus still
would not sign it. Finally, in desperation, they went to the
president of the company and told him the problem, and he
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982) (Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations).
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said "You send Gus in here and I'll talk to him." Gus walked
into the president's office and the president threw the con-
tract at Gus and said, "Gus, either you sign that contract or
you're fired." Gus took out his pen and signed the agree-
ment. The president of the company looked at him and said,
"Now will you tell me why in hell you wouldn't sign it up to
now?" Gus shrugged his shoulders and said, "Nobody every
explained it to me that well before."
Let me see if I can explain RICO as I see it; RICO:
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations. Who could op-
pose a bill designed to get at such nefarious activities? Why is
a federal judge, sworn to uphold the law and the Constitution
of the United States, contending that a law aimed at racket-
eer influenced corrupt organizations ought to be scrapped?
Well, I must confess, first of all, that I appear here wear-
ing more than the normal amount of sackcloth and ashes. It
is not that I voted for the Organized Crime Act of 1970 of
which RICO is a part. While I was present at the creation,
along with Professor Blakey, I did not vote for the bill. I am
afraid my transgression was much greater. I made the mis-
take of warning Papa Blakey and my former Congressional
colleagues what a bad boy RICO was going to grow up to be.
I helped create a legislative history that has since been used
by various litigants to try to prove that the Act can be
stretched to cover any kind of lawsuit. I confess that I used a
substantial amount of hyperbole in trying to build opposition
to the entire Act when it came up for floor consideration. I
stand amazed, however, at how modest my hyperbolic horri-
ble examples were compared to what really has happened in
the real world when lawyers have gotten hold of it.
The use of the civil RICO provision as a weapon in vari-
ous sorts of commercial disputes is, to my mind, the most in-
credible expansion of what was once a little cottage industry
into a most important tool of civil litigation. First of all, even
my warnings in 1970 about the future did not suggest the
sheer volume of RICO claims that would be filed. During the
first ten or eleven years after the Act was passed in 1970,
there were not too many private RICO claims filed. It was
used in a few criminal cases, and occasionally you would find
it in a civil dispute. Since 1981 or 1982, the number of such
claims has risen beyond measure and I use the words "be-
yond measure" advisedly and literally.
Most-or at least many civil RICO claims-never go to
trial. Indeed, they are not even meant for real litigation pur-
poses. They serve a very awful purpose, a very distressing
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purpose, just in being put in the lawsuit in the first place.
Their addition to a civil complaint has a profound impact on
the defendant. No defendant-even Mr. American Express,
the Card-Robinson-wants to be known as a racketeer, wants
a finding in a civil suit that he has been engaged in racketeer
influenced activities. And so what started out as a small cot-
tage industry for federal prosecutors has become a common-
place weapon in the civil litigator's arsenal.
Just a few weeks ago, I received an advertisement from
one of the legal publishers urging me to become a subscriber
to the Civil RICO Report; they told me what terrible things
could happen to me if I did not keep up with all the new uses
of RICO-what could happen to me as a lawyer, and what
could happen to my clients, if I did not advise them of it.
Think of it: a whole loose-leaf service just developed from a
throw-away section of the Organized Crime Act. In looking
through one of the American Bar Association manuals, I
found that the Corporation Law Section has a separate sub-
committee on civil RICO.
In preparing for my appearance here today, I went
through some of the cases in which a civil RICO claim has
been filed. And the range of cases boggle the mind. These
are not cases against Mafia figures. These have nothing to do
with some poor merchant who has been squeezed by the
mafiosi in a loan transaction. RICO makes its appearance in
everything from divorce suits to religious disputes, to suits
against one of the national candidates for President, to a ma-
jor political party, and to just about every kind of garden va-
riety of contractual and securities dispute that you could im-
agine between businessmen, to corporate raids, to defenses
against corporate raids, to state efforts to collect state sales
taxes from local businessmen.
If you find it hard to relate that potpourri to organized
crime or racketeering, you are not alone. Every judge, almost
without exception, including the five Justices of the Supreme
Court who upheld the interpretation of civil RICO to cover
all of these things, has wistfully begged and urged the Con-
gress to reexamine what it has wrought.
A distinguished circuit judge in this circuit, Judge Bauer,
was forced to uphold my home state of Illinois' use of civil
RICO against a gasoline dealer who under-reported his sales
taxes that were due the state of Illinois. They threw a civil
RICO charge at him and Judge Bauer had to uphold it, but
he said in his opinion he hoped that his ruling would appear
to Congress as the "distress flag" that it is and urged Con-
19861
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gress to reexamine the use of civil RICO.
One of the few issues, as I said, on which both the major-
ity and the minority agree in the Sedima2 case was that civil
RICO was being used in ways not contemplated by Congress
as a weapon against legitimate businessmen in ordinary com-
mercial disputes. The civil RICO count today has become
boilerplate in commercial lawsuits. Its presence in a com-
plaint frequently forces defendants to settle and pay out for
frivolous disputes under pain of having to defend against be-
ing labeled a racketeer. And because of this intimidation fac-
tor, it is impossible to even accurately measure the full impact
of civil RICO. We do know that the oppressive use of it in a
complaint has created a very disastrous effect in the civil bar.
Some judges, including four Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States, would have tempered the lan-
guage of civil RICO so as to preclude the incredible results
that are being achieved under it. I have to say in all candor
that had I been one of those judges, I would not have agreed
with the four. I think that while the Congress may not have
contemplated the present use of civil RICO, the words are so
loose-so many loose canons were set forth in the country
when that provision passed the Congress of the United
States-that a judge performing the duty of interpreting the
laws as Congress wrote them has no choice but to acknowl-
edge that its use by present civil litigation experts is within
the confines of the law. So I would say that Congress has to
change the law, that it is not appropriate for a court to try to
narrow it by some kind of artificial means.
There are several ways to change RICO that are cur-
rently pending before the Congress. I would hope that, at the
very least, Congress would give special attention to a bill pro-
posed by Congressman Boucher, a distinguished Virginia
congressman. Unlike some of the other sponsors that have
bills before the Congress, and unlike some of the opponents
of the original Organized Crime Act of 1970, Congressman
Boucher proposes to use scalpels rather than meat-axes.
Some of Congressman Boucher's predecessors promised that
the Organized Crime Act of 1970 would cure everything
from organized crime to hoof and mouth disease. Some of his
other predecessors, like your orator, insisted that the entire
bill be scrapped because it would reach everything from Sat-
urday night poker games to prosecutorial excesses against in-
nocent people.
2. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
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Well, the Organized Crime Act of 1970 has not wiped
out organized crime-you may have noticed that. But neither
has it led to all the prosecutorial excesses that I envisioned.
In fact, the guidelines used by the Department of Justice
before it proceeds under the criminal RICO provisions of the
Act have been a model of self-restraint. And while I continue
to think the language is too broad in criminal as well as in
civil RICO, I recognize that we have not had the kind of
problems with criminal RICO that we have with civil RICO.
Since these criminal provisions, and other provisions of
the Act, have proved helpful if not lethal in the ongoing war
against organized crime, I think that there is no reason to
change them at this point. But however one might feel about
those other provisions, it is clear that the civil RICO provi-
sion, as it was written and as it is being used, goes beyond
anything that Congress had in mind. In 1970, for example,
even I would not have suggested that this section of the Act
would become a real weapon in resolving divorce disputes or
religious controversies. That point is beyond dispute; there-
fore, we need to address this cancer that is chewing up civil
litigation.
Let me tell you how it works. Racketeering activity is de-
fined in the RICO statute-in the organized crime stat-
ute-and it includes a variety of activities. It includes some
really serious crimes of violence-murder, kidnapping, arson,
robbery. It also includes a lot of white collar
crimes-gambling, bribery, extortion. It includes narcotics
crimes and counterfeiting. But then it goes on to include a
couple of items in the definition of racketeering activities that
are, in and of themselves, troublesome sections of the federal
criminal law. It includes crimes relating to mail fraud, crimes
relating to wire fraud, and crimes relating to obstruction of
justice. This is the problem that civil RICO creates, to com-
pound the problems that those laws might have on their own
two feet: section 1964, the RICO statute itself, in part (C)
says that any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 may sue therefore in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover
three-fold the damages he sustains and the cost of his suit in-
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee.
Now, let's be very specific. You are plaintiff's lawyer, in
almost any type of civil action. Let's take a divorce action.
There is one that I think we would all agree is not normally
the basis for going into the criminal code of the United
States. You, as a lawyer for Winnie Wife, allege that Henry
1986]
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Husband on two separate occasions-you have to have
two-called his broker in New York on the telephone and
sold stocks that were jointly owned by the couple, and he
stashed the proceeds in his own bank account. Now, because
he used an interstate wire to achieve his nefarious results,
you add a RICO count to the end of the divorce complaint or
in a separate action, and you seek to have him, and maybe his
broker and his bank as well, branded as Racketeer Influenced
Corrupt Organizations. Does that sound silly? Well, the fact
of the matter is that is exactly one of the divorce suits that
was brought, where a RICO charge was alleged in which the
plaintiff sought three times the value of the securities that
had been transferred and the attorney's fee. It sounds so ex-
treme that even I would not have offered that as an example
of the terrible things that could have happened when I op-
posed the bill. But it can happen, and it will happen.
Well, you can ask, what business does the federal crimi-
nal code have in the abuse of a marriage by one spouse over
the other. You can ask why it gets involved in a lot of other
actions to which it has been a party. Now that it has been
used that often in divorce cases and other places, it is going
to be used even more. And my concern is that there is almost
no limit to the kind of civil complaint that the civil RICO can
be used and abused, from corporate takeovers to garden vari-
ety contractual disputes.
When I was complaining about the state of the law, a
lawyer friend of mine-he is a good lawyer, he is not some
ambulance chaser-said, "you know, I wouldn't dream of fil-
ing a complaint involving securities violations or almost any
other kind of corporate mis-activity that did not include a
RICO count-a civil RICO count." I was a little bit as-
tounded when he made that statement. I said, "I can't believe
that. You're a responsible lawyer. Why would you do it? Why
do you do it?" He said, "Well, I would think that a client
would have a pretty good malpractice suit against me if I es-
chewed the use of RICO, given how popular and how wide-
spread it is and how successful it has been. And I think for
me to avoid that very juicy remedy of three-fold damages and
attorney's fees is not the kind of risk that a careful lawyer
takes."
Again, let me just refer for a minute to the legislative
history. It is pretty clear that these results were not intended
by Congress; but then the legislative history of civil RICO is
itself not the best example of how the legislative process
ought to work. On this, there is no dispute. When the bill
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passed the Senate, there was not a civil RICO provision in
the bill. It came over to the House. The House committee
was under some duress to do something because anybody
who was not for this bill or something like it was for organ-
ized crime. I was one of the thirty-six people who ultimately
ended up voting against the bill, and every campaign thereaf-
ter when I ran for Congress, someone would get up in my
meetings and say, "Why are you for organized crime?" And I
would have to explain that I was not really for organized
crime, even though I had voted against the bill. But the civil
RICO provision was inserted in the House with very little de-
bate, and then it went over to the Senate where there was no
debate, and the result is that you really have almost the na-
ked words of the statute which, as I described earlier, seem to
cover the waterfront.
If I had known then what I know now about the legisla-
tive process and legislative history-this was my first term in
Congress I say as my plea in abatement-I would not have
gone through all those hyperbolic examples. Instead, I would
have gone to Manny Celler, the Chairman of the House Judi-
ciary Committee and the floor manager of the bill-and I
would have said, "Manny, I've got thirty-six votes in my
pocket who are ready to really set off a fire fight against this
bill, but we will vote for it, or at least be quiet about it, if you
will agree to some dialogue that we can have on the floor."
And he would have said, "Anything, anything you want, Ab.
You write it. I will say it." And I could have written the dia-
logue in which I would have said, "Now we certainly don't
want this to apply to divorce cases." And he would have said,
"You are absolutely right." And I would have said, "We cer-
tainly do not want to apply this to religious controversies."
And he would have said, "You are absolutely right." And I
could have gotten any kind of legislative history I wanted.
I remember a story that happened while I was in Con-
gress about how the legislative process works. Mo Udall had
been trying to put through a strip mining bill for many, many
years. There was a big fight about it because the miners were
afraid it was going to cost jobs, and the environmentalists
wanted a tougher bill, and the states were concerned that
they were giving up all their state sovereignty. He passed it
one time, and the Senate refused to pass it. He passed it a
second time, and President Ford vetoed it. Finally, he had a
Democratic president and support in both Houses, and he
gingerly put together this coalition of miners and state offi-
cials and others to support the bill. It got out on the floor.
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He had an assurance from the White House that they would
sign the bill if it came to them.
It got out on the floor and Mo was managing the bill;
one of the congressmen from West Virginia got up and said,
"Now will the gentleman from Arizona assure me that this
makes clear that the states remain sovereign and are in con-
trol of their own destinies as far as strip mining is con-
cerned?" And Mo Udall said, "The gentlemen from West
Virginia is absolutely correct. This bill protects state sover-
eignty and is very careful to see to it that states' rights are
not impinged in any manner, shape or form." A little later in
the debate, one of the environmentalist congressmen got up
and said, "Now will the gentleman from Arizona assure me
that this bill once and for all sets federal standards and makes
it clear that we are going to have federal determination of
what are good strip mining practices?" And Mo Udall said,
"The gentleman from New York is absolutely correct. This
bill once and for all sets federal standards that can be en-
forced." And he came back from the cloakroom for a drink
of water, and we laughed and we said, "Hey Mo, they both
can't be right." And he said, "The gentleman is absolutely
correct. "
Well, I could have gotten that kind of dialogue, I'm sure,
from Manny Celler, and maybe I could have avoided some of
the problems. But I did not know then what I know now, and
we have ended up with a lot of problems that are not going
to go away.
Let me just summarize briefly in the minute or so that I
want to take. The worst part of the offense that we have
foisted off on American law from this loose language is that
we have federalized state tort laws. We have federalized state
criminal laws. And we have done this to an incredible degree.
I spent ten years in the state legislature of Illinois (some-
times called the last vestige of democracy in the raw, until
you go to the Indiana legislature when you are not sure that
Illinois deserves that title). I spent an equal amount of time in
the Congress of the United States. I came away from those
two sets of somewhat different experiences convinced that
there are many things we must do as a nation. We obviously
cannot handle matters of defense on a state by state basis,
even though the state of Nebraska insists on having its own
navy. I do not think we can handle national defense on that
basis. I do not think we can handle matters of foreign policy.
And I think that there are matters of protection of civil
rights and state excesses, for instance, that need to be done
[Vol. 2
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on a national basis. But the last thing we need to do is to turn
every garden variety contract dispute into a federal case.
The late Justice Felix Frankfurter used to say that the
states ought to serve as social laboratories, where they could
experiment in new ways to solve old problems. I've always
thought that made a lot of sense: that the genius of our fed-
eral system has been when we have left the states free to find
their own ways to solve problems that basically have a local or
state concern. I came out of ten years in the state legislature,
aware of all the frailties of that form of government, and yet
very much "a states righter," believing that when a problem
has a local tie, you are much better off settling that problem
on a local level. And unless we want to get rid of the state
courts completely, we have to stop federalizing things like na-
tional tort laws.
Whether Frankfurter was right or not, I know that the
legitimacy of law and law-making has an important ingredient
of localism. The problem can be solved best at the most local
level at which it can be solved. I do not think that federal
judges and the United States Congress are going to shed any
light on the problems of divorce, or the failure of a local
seller of real estate or linoleum to deliver the goods to his
customer on time. I do not think that the federal courts or
the Congress are going to be the best places to solve that
problem. I am not sure the states will do it or that the local
courts will do it either. But at least there will be somebody
for the local people to kick and yell at when it does not come
out right. Ladies and gentlemen, civil RICO was bad legislat-
ing; it has turned out to be bad law. We ought to get rid of it.
PROFESSOR BLAKEY
Will somebody tell me what I am doing here? I am a law
professor. That is a federal judge. I am debating a federal
judge? When I have opinions, I put them in law review arti-
cles. When he has opinions, he hands them down.
This brings to mind a scene out of The Godfather. You
remember it. Brando had just died. Al Pacino had just be-
come the Godfather. The plot to kill Pacino had been uncov-
ered. Abe Vigoda had been captured and was going to be
taken out and killed. He turns to Robert Duval and says,
"Tell Michael that I liked him. There was nothing personal
about it. It was just business." I'm trying to figure out here
whether I'm Abe Vigoda or Robert Duval. But Judge, I hope
you'll understand that I always liked you. There is nothing
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
personal about this.
Let's do a couple of things. Let's begin by reviewing the
history of what really happened. People who talk about
RICO are a lot like the actors in the classic Japanese movie
Roshamon. Those of you who saw it will recall it dealt with a
rape of an individual by a bandit. Then the story is told from
the perspective of the rapist, the bandit, the woman, an inde-
pendent witness, and a third party. Each person sees some-
thing very different. The perspective that I give you is that of
the person who was told what to do and did it.
Let's go down the history: The Organized Crime Con-
trol Act was introduced in the Senate, and at that particular
point in time, the statute did not have in it a provision for
triple damages and private civil suits. A separate bill con-
tained those provisions. It was referred to the American Bar
Association, where it was approved. A recommendation was
made that it not be enacted as part of the Sherman Act, but
passed as independent legislation. That bill had the triple
damage provisions in it from the beginning; it was not just a
throw away provision at the end, as Judge Mikva just indi-
cated. Both bills were processed in the Senate. The American
Bar Association appeared and testified in behalf of the triple
damage provisions. The President of the United States en-
dorsed the triple damage provisions, while it was pending in
the Senate. A combined bill was then reported out in the
Senate.
I would make two points about the Senate debate. One
deals with Judge Mikva's notion that somehow this statute
was always processed solely as an Organized Crime Control
Act. That is simply not true. A conscious decision was made
by the Senators that this bill would be systemic reform, not
limited to organized crime. That point was specifically raised
by Senator Hart and Senator Kennedy in the Senate, and it
was responded to by Senator McClellan and the others. The
bill was always touted as systemic reform.
Let me put this in a slightly different context for you.
Title Two of the Organized Crime Control Act deals with
immunity. Its provisions were used in the Watergate hearings
by Senator Ervin to immunize John Dean in his testimony
against the White House. Nobody objected that Title Two of
the Organized Crime Control Act secured John Dean's testi-
mony in a congressional hearing. Some people suggested that
there was crime in the White House, but nobody suggested it
was organized. It is only a Johnny-come-lately who somehow
now objects to the Organized Crime Control Act in Title IX
[Vol. 2
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being used for people whose names don't end in vowels. And
I might add that I did not hear Congressman Mikva object
that it was an abuse of the statute when the Organized Crime
Control Act was being used to secure John Dean's testimony.
The statute did not-and this is the second point-did
not have in it as it passed the Senate a triple damage clause.
Nevertheless, at that time, drafters of the legislation were op-
erating under the dispensation of the Supreme Court's teach-
ing in Borak,8 not Cort v. Ash.' And it was appropriate to as-
sume that there was an implied cause of action in it. Indeed,
that was the assumption made by the people processing the
legislation. It passed the Senate, and it went to the House.
The American Bar Association appeared before the
House Committee-the Committee on which Congressman
Mikva sat-and testified that they wanted the triple damage
clause put back in. That is one part of the testimony. The
other part of the testimony in the House hearings is by the
Association of the Bar of New York City. They said, "This
statute is too broad." They specifically said that the bill
would make rackeetering cases out of all sorts of securities
matters. And that this was inappropriate. Congress had a
choice at that point, either to go with the Association of the
Bar of New York City or to go with the American Bar Asso-
ciation. It chose to go with the American Bar Association.
The gentleman to my left was on the Committee, and he
dissented at that time. He said the bill would have a substan-
tial impact on the dockets of the federal courts. He later took
the floor of the House and he said the bill would be used in
ordinary commercial disputes. He also said that the bill could
be used in civil cases without a criminal conviction. He de-
bated it over a two day period. He raised the organized crime
objection on the House floor, and he was responded to by
Congressman Poff. Congressman Poff said, "I'm sure that the
gentleman from Illinois would be the first to object if this bill
had been limited in some way to people of a certain ethnic
background. This bill is systemic reform. It applies across the
board to everyone."
Congress then passed the bill over the objections of Con-
gressman Mikva and the small band of people who repre-
sented his perspective at that time. It did not go directly to
the President of the United States.
Congressman Mikva has been around for a while. He
3. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
4. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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knows what has to happen to a bill amended in the House. It
has to go back to the Senate. When it got back to the Senate,
far from being a bill passed without debate, as he told you,
the bill was specifically debated. Senator McClellan took the
floor and commented on the House-passed amendments. He
applauded the addition of the triple damage clause. Senator
Dole said, "This bill should be passed." And he cited Title
IX, and particularly the private remedies in it, as a reason
why it should be passed.
Now, Congressman Mikva also knows how it works in the
Senate. The bills that pass the House are circulated to the
people in the Senate. People are asked, "Do you want to vote
on anything in this bill?" If the Senators do not have the
votes-and they did not, as Congressman Mikva did not have
in the House-they say, "No, let it go to the President." So,
it went to the President, and the President signed it.
Now you tell me, when the issues are specifically raised in
the legislative history, contrary to what the good Judge says,
when the language is unequivocal, and he concedes this, how
it is somehow an abuse to use the statute in the way in which
it was advertised?
You have heard from two people.here. You have heard
from Congressman Mikva, who now acknowledges, as Judge
Mikva, that he was wrong in 1970,on his estimates of the pos-
sible abuse of this statute on the criminal side. He has now
repudiated his former position, and he is now presenting it to
you in another form, as if he had never presented it to you
before, his estimates of the abuse of this statute on the civil
side. Let me see whether his facts today are any better than
his memory of yesterday: they are not.
Judge Mikva suggests that the number of cases being
processed in the court are without number. Well, that is sim-
ply not true. In fact, the Justice Department has done a study
of the civil RICO cases, and that study indicates that in fif-
teen years there have been less than 500 civil RICO cases
filed.
Now, he will say, "But they have all been filed recently."
All right Judge, I will give you 500 a year-a year-indeed,
just as a margin of error, I will give you that factor multiplied
by ten. Let's make it 5,000 RICO cases a year-that would
be approximately two percent of the federal
docket-approximately two percent of the 250,000 cases
filed each year. That is hardly a floodgate.
Let's take his second point. Is this litigation in some
sense new and therefore threatening, by its volume and its
[Vol. 2
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character, to inundate the federal courts? Answer, no. The
same Department of Justice study indicated that sixty-five
percent of those civil RICO cases would have been in the fed-
eral courts on another basis of jurisdiction-either diversity
or an independent federal claim.
So, we are not talking about either wholly new cases, and
we are not talking about a volume that threatens to inundate
the federal courts at any time soon. But let's assume that
these cases are both new and of a large proportion. Does that
mean that simply the last comer should find himself
excluded?
Or, if we are concerned about the federal docket, don't
we examine the full menu of what is in the federal courts and
decide which ought to have priority? Certainly, it ought not
be merely the last in time. Let's ask what federal interest lies,
for example, in having car accident diversity cases tried in
federal courts. Take that class of cases out and you will have
room for 5,000 RICO cases.
I do this only with trepidation. I hear complaints about
the volume of federal litigation from my friends on my right.
I normally don't hear it from my friends on the left.
I suggest to you in a large number-not necessarily all
cases-that complaints about docket clogging is a code word
that in fact is a complaint about the underlying nature of the
claim. Let me give you the subject matter of the top four out
of five cases in the federal courts: prisoner petitions, social
security, civil rights and labor. Is it because some people do
not like the underlying plea for human dignity associated
with prisoner petitions, social security, civil rights, and labor
that they are complaining about the docket clogging indi-
rectly when they are not willing to complain about it directly?
And that brings me to my next point. Look, we can talk
about what RICO meant in 1970 to the people who
processed it. That is a historical question that the historians
can write articles about in learned journals till time runs out.
But for lawyers, that issue is now settled. Five people on the
Supreme Court-and that's still enough-said that statute
means what it says. As such, the legal question is over.
We are not now dealing with what that statute means as
a matter of its legislative history or its text. The issue before
us now is should we repeal it, in whole or in part, and for the
answer to that, we need to turn to current data-the current
situation.
Let me see if I can trace for you why I believe that RICO
plays an important role in federal law, comparable to pris-
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oner petitions, social security, civil rights or labor.
Note that the complaint here is not over RICO's applica-
tion in any area other than fraud. And the complaint is not
over its application to anybody other than what Congressman
Mikva-now Judge Mikva-suggests are legitimate busi-
nesses. Let's drop a footnote. How do you know the business
is legitimate until the person has had his day in court to test
the question? Less than ten RICO cases have gone to trial.
All of this is a complaint based on the face of the complaints.
I am an old-fashioned person. I believe that everybody is
entitled to his day in court. A well pled complaint ought to
be tried. And if it turns out that there are a substantial num-
ber of not only well pled, but supported RICO complaints,
that is a very different thing than simply to accept the name
of corporation, which somehow makes it beyond suit.
I do not think wardens are beyond suit. I do not think
cops are beyond suit. I do not think doctors are beyond suit.
I do not even think lawyers are beyond suit. I think in our
society nobody is above the law, including legitimate
businesses.
Let's take the example of the legitimate businesses cited
in the Sedima opinion as ones that ought to be above suit.
Thank God for this one. You all know what it is. "Outra-
geous" is what one circuit judge called a civil suit against E.F.
Hutton. Hutton now, of course, has pled guilty to 2,000
counts of mail fraud.
If we are going to go down the lists of legitimate busi-
nesses, let's take the General Electric Company, for example,
who's cheating us on the Minuteman Missile; or Rockwell In-
ternational; or General Dynamics.
I do not think any business is legitimate simply because it
develops a favorable image for itself through advertising.
The time to find out whether they are legitimate is in the
case, and the place to find that out is in a full and fair trial.
But let's talk about the problem. Current estimates sug-
gest that the economic crime problem, the fraud problem, in
this country is as high as $200 billion. Two hundred billion
dollars. It approaches our national deficit. That makes it as
high or as close to our drug problem. Let's drop a footnote
there. Putting heroin to one side, hey look, the drug problem
is largely voluntary. I have a choice as to whether I use co-
caine or marijuana.
Do I have a choice on the issue of fraud? Judge Mikva
would say, "Let the states handle it." Let the states handle it
under a nineteenth-century fraud jurisprudence that was
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written from the perspective of the entrepreneur capital-
ists-not the modern consumer. It was written at a time in
which we did not have major labor unions, in which we did
not have major corporations. We did not have major insur-
ance companies. And I can go down the list. We live today in
a society where we are necessarily, not optionally, dependent
upon the faithfulness of fiduciaries-our lawyers, our doc-
tors, our brokers, our insurance agents. If he is going to offer
me nineteenth-century fraud law as an adequate remedy
RICO is not different from either the antitrust or securi-
ties statutes. It takes the messages of both and generalizes
them across our society. If his arguments for the defederal-
ization of RICO are appropriate, they apply with equal force
to the antitrust and the securities laws. And I have not heard
him make that argument in a principled fashion.
Let me bring it home to you. Current estimates in this
country right now are that insurance fraud costs this country
about $11 billion. Now everybody says, "Well who cares?
The insurance company pays for it." If you believe that, then
I suggest that you not purchase any bridges in Brooklyn. In
fact, an insurance company has to collect approximately
$1.25 for every $1.00 it pays out. That means all of us are
paying approximately $13.75 billion in extra insurance
premiums.
And who do the costs of fraud come from? Who are
those people who are the victims of fraud in our society? The
old, the young, those on welfare, and the weak are the people
who are dependent in our society, and they are the ones who
need precisely the kind of protection that RICO would offer
them.
Who are the groups appearing, along with Judge Mikva,
before the House Judiciary Committee? Who has he associ-
ated himself with in this situation? The National Association
of Manufacturers, the banks, the insurance companies, right
down the list.
Who has testified against his -position? The consumer
groups. The Gray Panthers. The people largely without
power in this society. I think sometimes you can judge a
man's position by the company he keeps.
Now Congressman Mikva-now Judge Mikva-suggests
to you that his amendment-the criminal conviction amend-
ment-is not going to harm this bill. Well, now, what he
ought to do is read the opinion of the United States Supreme
Court in Sedima, in particular he ought to read footnote num-
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ber nine, in which Justice White proceeds to analyze the so-
called criminal conviction limitation. And I note that not onejudge in dissent undertook to defend the criminal conviction
limitation.
What impact would it have on criminal cases? Well, first
of all, it would be a perverse incentive in plea bargaining.
You'd plea bargain out to anything, but a RICO count, to
avoid the triple damage suit, and you would have the govern-
ment dealing with civil responsibility, not just criminal
responsibility.
It would undermine the prosecutor's ability to obtain a
conviction, because every complaining witness in a RICO case
would be open to the following question: Isn't it true that
your ability to sue in this case depends upon a criminal con-
viction in this prosecution? Answer: Yes. It would, therefore,
undermine the credibility of the complaining witness.
It would put incredible pressures on prosecutors who
were trying to decide which cases to bring. Political pressure
would be put on prosecutors to bring cases so that people
could follow up with civil litigation.
It would also be unjust in application. Every time the
government made a major criminal case by immunizing one
party to testify against the other, they would not only immu-
nize that person from criminal responsibility, but civil respon-
sibility. They would be picking and choosing not only who
goes to jail but who pays triple damages.
From the perspective of defendants, is that a fair mea-
sure? Is it fair that their civil responsibility would depend on
the exercise of prosecutive discretion?
What about decisions in the criminal justice process that
did not go down on the merits? We are all lawyers here. Eve-
rybody knows what the suppression sanction is, the exclusion-
ary rule. Do criminal trials really determine guilt or inno-
cence, or do they determine legal guilt and legal innocence?
If Judge Mikva really wants to use prosecutive discretion
as a means to limit the ability of private parties to bring civil
suits, he ought not to base it on a conviction; he ought to
base it on indictments. He is using this wrong surrogate.
But let's examine what other claims for relief in Anglo-
American jurisprudence are so limited. Antitrust is not. Se-
curities is not.
He complains about the racketeer label. What about call-
ing a person a "killer," which is precisely what we do in a
wrongful death action. Do we surround wrongful death ac-
tions with specialized protections? Higher burdens of proof?
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Prosecutor approval? Criminal conviction limitations? No.
Why has he, therefore, picked this cause of action alone to
treat in this unique way? That's the question he has to an-
swer. I have no full answer for it. I can not find any justifica-
tion for it.
Let me end with what I said when I began. I really
meant it when I said I liked Judge Mikva. I worked for a con-
servative southern Senator, while he was a liberal northern
Congressman. Those issues that he and I came into conflict
over were principally in the criminal justice area. But on
other issues-that man fought against an unjust war in Viet-
nam. That man spoke for the oppressed in this country-the
old, the poor, and the black. On those issues, Congressman
Mikva and I were one.
I am sure that if we talked long enough I could bring
him to see the error in his ways on this issue, too. Come
home Judge Mikva to your people.
CROSSFIRE PERIOD
Mikva: Well, I don't know if I am addressing Al Pacino or
Roger Ebert or Jesse James. But let me see whomever this
mysterious person is.
Have all of you at least been exposed to the doctrine of
implied remedies? Do you know what it is? It is the notion
that sometimes Congress intends for a federal law with crimi-
nal sanctions to be available to a private "attorney general,"
to a private litigant, to bring suits and sometimes not.
Many parts of the Securities Act have been held to have
implied remedies in them. Others have not. The Supreme
Court and other courts have struggled with this problem for
at least fifty years. It probably preceded the Securities Act,
but certainly since the Securities Act, every statute that has
any kind of a criminal penalty to it, the courts have struggled
with the problem of whether Congress intended for that stat-
ute to have an implied remedy. Some justices of the Supreme
Court, Justice Rehnquist for instance, think the whole doc-
trine is pernicious. Others think that it is a good idea. Con-
gress struggles with what the courts will do, and you get a
great deal of backing and forthing about whether a statute
does have an implied remedy or does not. Obviously, Con-
gress can always say specifically this shall be a remedy for the
private individual as well as for public prosecutors.
My question is, Professor Blakey, as a professor of law,
put aside your movie critic hat and your actor's hat. Do you
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really think that Congress, back in 1970, knew that they were
wiping out fifty years of implied remedy dogma and doctrine
by that one little piece-the civil RICO act-which automati-
cally created implied remedies for every securities act, every
contract claim, every tort claim? Do you really think that
Congressman Poff knew he was doing that when he pushed
so hard at your little creation?
Blakey: Notice carefully what he said. He said, "Was Congress
creating an implied remedy?" And of course they were not.
They were creating an express remedy. There is no implied
remedy under the individual criminal provisions. There is
now an express remedy when you can show in a civil court
the elements of the criminal offense.
Did Congress intend that? Well, I don't know. Congress-
man Mikva told his fellow congressmen what was going on.
And into the teeth of what he said at the time, they passed it.
And the President signed it. What better evidence of intent
do you have than what people say? And not what people sub-
sequently resurrect and reconstruct about it.
I think Congress knew full well what they were doing in
1970. They created an express cause of action for the area of
fraud. The findings of the statute, in the front, decry fraud as
a problem. The provisions of the statute are not implied,
they are express. Securities fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud,
travel fraud are on the face of the statute. The cause of ac-
tion is expressed, and if there was any doubt, there is a provi-
sion in RICO that calls for liberal construction. In the legisla-
tive history the issue was raised. What else could they have
done but have understood what they did? I think they did.
RICO is not difficult to read. It is hard to accept in some
people's hearts, which are also hard.
Judge, you cited for our friends here, gathered together
to learn, a single instance of what you thought was abuse.
The filing of the case in the divorce action. The use of RICO
in a divorce context. Will you tell everybody here what hap-
pened in that case?
Mikva: Yes, she did not get the divorce.
Blakey: No, what happened to her RICO complaint?
Mikva: She did not get the divorce and therefore she could
not get the RICO claim. He was not a racketeer after all.
Blakey: No, what actually happened in the case is the judge
dismissed it.
Mikva: Because she did not get the divorce. He was not a
racketeer. It turned out he only beat her a little bit. That
does not make him a racketeer. So she did not get the RICO
[Vol. 2
RICO AND ITS PROGENY
claim.
Blakey: No, in point of fact, if my memory serves me, in this
particular case, it was dismissed, and the lawyer that brought
it had filed against him a petition for Rule 11 sanctions.
Now, Judge Mikva, do you think we ought to repeal
every statute, including, for example, the securities or the an-
titrust statutes, merely because it has some frivolous cases
brought under it?
Mikva: No. And it is not the frivolous cases that worry me,
though even there I would recall for your somewhat selective
memory, that I offered an amendment on the floor of the
House to provide some sanctions for frivolous cases and you
and your minions opposed it. But I won't get into that. As I
say, your memory is a little selective. That's understandable.
You are older than you were when we last discussed this mat-
ter. People age differently.
Anyway, I am not talking about the frivolous cases. I am
talking about cases that are real, that -involve big bucks,
where RICO has been used as an instrument of oppression.
He mentioned the Gray Panthers. My good friend Con-
gressman Wyden was representing the Gray Panthers in op-
posing the amendment to this Bill. Let me tell you who he
brought with him as his witness. He brought with him a six-
foot-ten basketball star with the Portland Trailblazers, who
complained that he had been bilked out of over a million dol-
lars by some investment advisor who identified himself as be-
ing with some important New York firm. The New York firm
claimed they never heard of the guy. But Mr. Wyden's
friend, the six-foot-ten basketball player who lost a million
dollars-he was the tallest Gray Panther I ever saw, and the
richest one too-wants to sue the New York broker as well as
this local guy (who I assume by this time is judgment-proof)
for his having been bilked out of a million dollars. Now, I am
all for him suing the New York stockbroker if he can show
there was some connection between his bilking and that New
York house. But if in fact the bilker was a perfect stranger, is
this something you really want to throw a- Racketeer Influ-
enced Corrupt Organization practice charge at? Do you re-
ally want to even have to make that company in New York
defend itself that it is not a racketeer? Is that really the way
we want to practice law?
Those are not frivolous cases, and there are more than
5,000 of them. There have been more than 5,000 filed this
year. If he is talking about the ones that came to judgment, it
is true that as of the beginning of the year, there were only
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about 300 that went to judgment. But as I said early in my
remarks, the problem is not only with judgments. Judges
strain as much as they can to try to avoid the incredible im-
pact of this section. The problem is the oppressive impact
that this RICO count has just by being filed as part of a
lawsuit.
You know, again I hate to come back to Professor
Blakey's selective memory, but I went back and looked at the
purposes of the statute, too. And right in the Senate report,
big as life, it says this: "It is the purpose of this Act to seek
the eradication of organized crime in the United States by
strengthening the legal tools and the evidence-gathering pro-
cess, by establishing new penal provisions, and by providing
enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlaw-
ful activities of those engaged in organized crime." And my
whole debate that he referred to in the House was the fact
that they never defined organized crime in the bill. And Con-
gressman Poff got up and said, "well, we don't know how to
define it," so we didn't. That's the whole business of ethnic
references. He suggested "Do you want us to do it by identi-
fying people whose names end in a vowel?" Well, my name
ends in a vowel and I obviously did not want him to identify
people by people whose names end in a vowel.
The fact of the matter is, that bill was sold to the Con-
gress of the United States as an attack on organized crime.
Then Attorney General John Mitchell beat his breast (that
was before he went to jail) about how this was the great tri-
umph of law over organized crime. If it had that kind of an
impact on organized crime, if civil RICO had been used to
the extent that it was promised to be used in terms of organ-
ized crime, maybe it would be worth some of the excesses
and some of the frivolous claims, but the fact of the matter is
that it has been abused and overused. Bob Blakey is abso-
lutely right-the language is clearly capable of being con-
strued to mean what the court has been saying it means, and
I acknowledged that freely at the beginning. That is why I
opposed it then. I wish I had not, as I say. I wish I had gone
through some mumbo jumbo, but clearly the language en-
compasses it-which is why it is not a court problem.
It is a Congressional problem. It is a policy problem. It is
a matter of bad public policy that was put in by the Congress
and has to be taken out by the Congress. And until it is, we
have to face the fact that Congress-sneakily through the
back door-wiped out all kinds of state laws, state doctrines,
and state sovereignty in order to slip in this little provision.
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They said on the surface, that it was for organized crime, but
in fact they really meant it to apply to every kind of commer-
cial dispute there is.
Now you know, the National Association of Manufactur-
ers is in bad shape if they have to always rely on me to bring
their chestnuts out of the fire. But sometimes, even the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers is right. And sometimes,
even an insurance company is right. And sometimes, even a
bank is right. And when you look at the entire list of com-
mercial enterprises in this country that have said that this is
an oppressive disaster as long as it stays on the books, it
seems to me that unless you are totally opposed to the capital-
ist system-I did not think you were, Professor Blakey-at
least the last Blakey I knew was not-then it seems to me
that you ought to recognize that this bill was not a good piece
of legislation in the first place, has become abused out of all
recognition in the second place, and ought to be gotten rid
of. Mr. Chairman, I yield you the floor.
Blakey: Let me comment, at least initially, on the false allega-
tion that RICO has distorted the actual litigation process. I
have sat on a RICO Cases Committee for the American Bar
Association. The RICO Cases Committee has on it members
of all segments of the American Bar Association-business,
labor and other groups. It was our conclusion that, far from
being an effective settlement weapon, the effect of the use of
a RICO count in a complaint was to cause a "truly legitimate
business" to dig in its heels, and not to settle cases that other-
wise would have been settled, if only for the nuisance thing.
That is one answer.
Let's take the next answer. What is the effect of a triple
damage count in a complaint, where there is some merit to
the suit? Let's talk about the normal balance of power in liti-
gation between insurance companies and policy hold-
ers-banks and depositors and others. The truth of the mat-
ter is, the person who can hire the most expensive lawyer and
can defend that case with a blizzard of white paper can buy
off legitimate claims-and this is not simply my own position
here, this is the position of the Seventh Circuit in Haroco, Inc.
v. American National Bank & Trust Co.," affirmed on other
grounds by the United States Supreme Court. The truth is
that the addition of a triple damage claim in these situations
gives the defendant the incentive to settle this at close to ac-
5. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), affd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct.
3291 (1985).
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tual damages. What it does is to even out an imbalance that is
already built in the system.
This is not only true under RICO, it's true under the
antitrust laws. The basic studies of the antitrust laws indicate
that they settle-they tend to settle out-at close to actual
damages. That sounds to me like moving things in the right
direction. That sounds to me like it's moving things towards
basic justice.
Congressman Mikva-now Judge Mikva-suggests that
this was a mistake in 1970. I think it was not a mistake in
1970. I think people understood what they were doing. And
I think when we look at contemporary events, that this stat-
ute can be seen as the culmination of a series of statutes in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in which
this country has reversed the nineteenth-century jurispru-
dence. We did it in antitrust at a national level. We did it
with the food and drug statutes. We did it with the meat
packing statutes. We did it with the labor statutes. We did it
in the securities statutes.
Let's talk about the securities statutes for a minute. Why
do we have two securities statutes-one in '33 and one in
'34? Because the brokers and the other financial racke-
teers-and that is what they were called in the legislative his-
tory-told the country that they could not get out of the De-
pression because the '33 act that simply held them
responsible for fraud was impeding economic recovery. And
they made a major effort to reach out and castrate the '33
act. And there is some argument that much of what they did
in '34 came close to it. Roosevelt resisted it at that time, be-
cause he thought integrity in the securities market was an im-
portant thing.
If we are to be misled by the business community that
somehow suggests that RICO is anti-business on the current
record, with less than ten verdicts handed down, we will be
buying an essentially Chicken Little argument that the sky is
going to fall. If you do not want a RICO problem, as a legiti-
mate business, do not engage in crime. RICO does not make
unlawful and subject to a civil suit anything that was not pre-
viously made unlawful by federal or state criminal statutes.
What they really mean is that traditional white collar
crime has not been prosecuted in this country. And that cor-
porations and people like you and I with basically white col-
lars have been able to talk our way out of the criminal pro-
cess. What Congressman Mikva-Judge Mikva-basically
wants when he wants to preserve the criminal side of
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RICO-he wants a blue collar criminal statute, and not a
white collar civil statute.
Well, you know, if our market is free because of the anti-
trust laws, it is not because of the exercise of prosecutive dis-
cretion by the Department of Justice. Less than fifteen per-
cent of the antitrust cases are brought by the Department of
Justice. Eighty-five percent or more are brought by private
parties. Look at the statistics in antitrust. Look at the statis-
tics in securities. Last year the antitrust division brought 75
criminal cases; private parties brought over 1300 antitrust
cases. Last year, the Securities and Exchange Commission
brought 26 criminal prosecutions. Private people brought
over 3,000 cases under the securities acts.
That is the kind of statistics that the business community
serving at its own special interest would like to see true under
RICO. If it is garden variety fraud, then I suggest it's time
we begin weeding it.

